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In this paper we present results from experimental asset markets and
simulations with traders who receive asymmetric information about the
fundamental value of an asset. In the experimental markets with repeti-
tion insiders outperform the market and uninformed computerized random
traders (monkeys) perform equally well compared to average informed
traders. This is in line with the results of the equilibrium simulation
output in which traders choose between a random strategy and their fun-
damental strategy. We further ¯nd that pattern of average informed not
being able to beat the uninformed is not due to their overcon¯dence but
due to the asymmetric information structure of the market.
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11 Introduction and Related Literature
In this paper we present asset markets with asymmetric information about the
fundamental value of a company. To control for the in°uence of subjects expe-
rience we run six experimental markets three times with identical subjects. To
check the in°uence of the asymmetric information structure on the distribution
of traders abnormal returns we set up simple agent-based simulations.
In previous empirical studies by e.g. Lakonishok and Lee (2001), Lin and
Howe (1990), and Seyhun (1986) for testing the strong form of the e±cient
market hypothesis (EMH) it is reported that insiders are able to outperform
the market. Whereas the outperformance of (illegal) insider trading is widely
accepted in the scienti¯c and ¯nance community questions on the performance
of less informed traders are hardly being answered. Some empirical evidence is
provided by Carhart (1997), Jensen (1968), and Malkiel (1995, 2003a,b, 2005)
in studies on the performance of mutual funds. They all ¯nd that mutual
fund managers fail to beat a passive investment strategy, as about 60 to 80%
of the funds underperform their benchmark index. Whereas it is relatively
easy to measure the returns of the funds, it is almost impossible to de¯ne the
information level of their managers. One could assume that they are neither
uninformed traders nor insiders, but their exact level of information is impossible
to assess empirically.
Thus, Huber (2007) and Huber et al. (2008) tackle the question on the value
of fundamental information with experimental markets. Here, one major ad-
vantage is that the experimenter can control the information level and measure
abnormal returns accordingly. In analogy to the empirical evidence they ¯nd
that insiders outperform the market signi¯cantly. More interestingly, Huber
(2007) ¯nds that the average informed traders underperform the worst informed
(who still have some piece of fundamental information) and Huber et al. (2008)
¯nd that completely uninformed traders end up with the same return as average
and relatively well informed traders. One potential shortcoming of these stud-
2ies is that the subjects take part in only one experimental session lasting about
one hour and thus the authors cannot control for potential learning e®ects of
experienced subjects.
This shortcoming can be crucial for the experimental outcome as Dufwenberg
et al. (2005) and Hussam et al. (2008) observe learning e®ects in experimental
asset markets with experienced subjects. In a setting which is based on the
seminal model of Smith et al. (1988) they report that markets with experienced
subjects exhibit fewer bubbles and therefore show a higher degree of market
e±ciency. If this learning behavior would also be evident in the experimental
markets presented in this paper, one could expect that traders ending up below
the market return would learn and search for a more pro¯table strategy in the
next repetitions of the market.
Alternatively, if no learning is observed and so the underperformers of one
repetition underperform again in the following repetitions, one could assume
overcon¯dence of the traders as a behavioral explanation. It is evident that hu-
mans are overcon¯dent as they frequently overestimate their performance with
respect to their abilities (e.g. Fischho® et al. 1977 and Keren 1988 in studies with
general knowledge questions). In a ¯nancial setting TÄ orngren and Montgomery
(2004) ¯nd that both experts and laypeople overestimate their judgements and
experts even fail to outperform a strategy of randomly choosing stocks. Davis
et al. (1994) report that the amount of information also interferes with overcon-
¯dence in ¯nancial settings. In a study with students predicting stock market
°uctuations they ¯nd that more information, even when redundant, increase the
level of overcon¯dence among the subjects. The widely observed overcon¯dence
bias has directly measureable consequences on real markets, as traders trade too
much with the consequence of decreasing net portfolio returns with increasing
trading volumes (Barber and Odean 2000).
To examine the value of information when controlling for overcon¯dence and
learning, we apply one of the market models presented in Kirchler (2008).1 To
1The experimental model studied here di®ers from those presented in Huber (2007) and Hu-
ber et al. (2008). The information structure is di®erent in both studies and the least informed
3obtain benchmarks we run agent-based simulations. This is crucial as it allows
us to check whether the asymmetric information structure itself can explain
the persistent underperformance of certain information levels. As the center of
our study we adopt an experimental treatment consisting of six markets. Each
market is repeated three times at di®erent days with identical subjects who are
endowed with the same information levels as before. Furthermore, we run a
questionnaire after each repetition to estimate overcon¯dence.
In the experimental treatment we ¯nd that uninformed computerized ran-
dom traders (monkeys) perform equally well with respect to average informed
traders throughout all three repetitions and that only insiders outperform the
market signi¯cantly. This is in line with the equilibrium outcome of the simu-
lation model in which agents can choose between a random and a fundamental
strategy until equilibrium is reached. In this regime only the best and second
best informed traders use a fundamental strategy while all other traders apply a
random strategy. Additionally, we neither ¯nd evidence for overcon¯dence nor
for learning of the traders in the experimental treatment. As we ¯nd relatively
strong similarities in the use of fundamental strategies and in the distribution of
abnormal returns between the experimental treatment and the equilibrium sim-
ulation, we conclude that the main reason why average informed do not manage
to outperform the random traders lies in the asymmetric information structure.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we present the market
model, the experimental treatment and the benchmark simulation setup. Sec-
tion 3 shows the results for both the benchmark simulations and the exper-
imental treatment and provides explanations on the origins of the persistent
underperformance of certain information levels. Finally, Section 4 summarizes
and discusses the results.
traders either have some piece of fundamental information (former study) or are uninformed
human traders (two treatments of the latter study). Instead, we implement computerized
random traders as least informed.
42 Market Model
In each market 10 traders interact in a continuous double auction for K periods.
They trade stocks of a virtual company for virtual money (Taler). The stock
does not pay dividends and no interest is paid for cash holdings.
2.1 Information System
The fundamental value of the stock is governed by the following stochastic
process:
FVk = FVk¡1 ¢ (1 + ²k); (1)
where FVk denotes the fundamental value of period k and ²k is a normally
distributed random variable with a mean of 0.5% and a standard deviation of
7.2%.2
To implement asymmetric information, we start with the idea of Hellwig
(1982) that better informed traders get relevant information earlier than others,
and we extend this concept to four information levels, Ij (I1 to I4). Only the
best informed traders (I4) know the fundamental value of the current period
k. Fundamental information provided to I4 in period k becomes available to
I3 in period k + 1, to I2 in period k + 2, etc. At the start of each period
traders are provided with new information. At this time information level I(j-
1) receive the information Ij had one period earlier, while the best informed
receive new information that nobody knew before. Subsequently, the expression
CVj denotes the conditional expected value of information level j. Figure 1
visualizes the information structure of one representative market. Furthermore,
we add uninformed traders as a ¯fth information level (I0). They do not get any
information on fundamentals throughout the whole experiment, although they
receive the same information on prices and on orders as all the other traders.
2In this model one period equals one month in reality. With these parameters the funda-
mental value increases by 6.2% p.a. and the annual standard deviation reaches 25%.
5Each information level is populated by two traders.
Insert Figure 1 about here
2.2 Market Architecture
Subjects trade in a continuous double auction market with open order book. All
orders are executed according to price and then time priority whereby market
orders have priority over limit orders and are executed instantaneously. Holdings
of cash and stocks are carried over from one period to the next. Traders can
submit as many bids and asks as they want, provided they have enough money
to buy or enough stocks to sell. Any order size and the partial execution of limit
orders are possible. Short selling is not allowed.
The trading screen provides subjects with current information on their stock
and money holdings, a realtime chart of past transaction prices, their trades
of the current period and their current wealth.3 After each period a history
screen informs subjects about their stock and cash holdings, wealth, conditional
expected value, the closing price of the market, their trading volume and the
total trading volume on the market of all previous periods. A chart of mean
market prices completes the history screen.
2.3 Experimental Treatment
We conduct one experimental treatment in which the six markets are run three
times on di®erent days with identical subjects at identical information levels.
We use three fundamental value processes which are perfectly randomized over
repetitions. Furthermore, the role of the uninformed is covered by computerized
random traders. They do not process any kind of information at any time,
instead they randomly place bids and asks (only limit orders) as follows:
Bidk;t = Pk;t § ²k;t;
Askk;t = Pk;t § ²k;t: (2)
3For further details see the screenshot in the Appendix.
6Here Pk;t denotes the current market price at time t in period k and ²k;t is
a standard normally distributed error term.
Insert Table 1 about here
Table 1 gives a brief overview over the parameter set of the two random
agents. Among both computerized traders, "Agent 1" is designed actively with
relatively short waiting times between his orders, Wt, and with a larger posted
quantity in each order, Q.4
2.4 Experimental Implementation
At the beginning of each market traders were briefed with written instructions.
Afterwards we ran four trial periods to allow subjects to become familiar with
the market. Each market ended between period 20 and 22 of 100 seconds each.5
To achieve a balanced panel of observations we limit our analysis to the ¯rst 20
periods within each repetition.
After the introduction and the trial periods subjects were randomly assigned
to one of the information levels which they kept for each repetition of each mar-
ket. In all experimental markets/repetitions each trader was initially endowed
with 40 stocks and 1600 in cash. The information structure was public knowl-
edge: Subjects knew how many information levels existed, how many traders
were endowed with each information level, and they knew their own information
level. They also knew that they will be endowed with the same information level
in the other two repetitions and that the other traders in the repeated markets
will be identical.
At the end of each repetition all stocks were bought back at the fundamental
value FVend (information of the insider, I4) of the last period. The ¯nal wealth,
FW, was converted into EUR at the exchange rate of 1 EUR equalling 175 Taler.
4Both variables are uniformly distributed and a random agent either places a bid or an ask
at once. The trading behavior of human traders of earlier experiments serve as a benchmark
for the parameter set.
5To avoid end-of-experiment e®ects we told traders that the market is randomly terminated
between periods 20 and 30 with equal probability in all three treatments.
7We conducted all markets in May 2008 with business students on a bachelor or
master level.6 Each session lasted 80 to 90 minutes, and the average earnings
were around 55 EUR. The market was programmed and conducted with z-Tree
3.0.6 (Fischbacher 2007) and the recruitment of the students was made with
ORSEE (Greiner 2004).
2.5 Theoretical Predictions { Simulation
To obtain theoretical benchmarks and to explore whether the information struc-
ture discriminates certain information levels persistently we run simulations
with almost identical parameters as in the experiments. Five agents with infor-
mation levels from I0 to I4 trade in an order-driven continuous double auction
market. In the simulation setting BASE all traders except the randomized I0
adopt a fundamental strategy according to their conditional expected value CV .
In the setting EQUIL the informed traders I1 to I4 choose between their fun-
damental strategy and a random strategy until a Nash-equilibrium is reached.
2.5.1 Trading Strategies and Order Matching in the Setting BASE
Every three seconds t an uniformly distributed random variable decides which
trader j wakes up who places both a bid and an ask. All informed traders (I1
to I4) strictly use a fundamental strategy. If they are randomly chosen to place
a limit bid and a limit ask, they do it according to the following rule:
Bidj;k;t = CVj;k ¡ j²j;k;tj;
Askj;k;t = CVj;k + j²j;k;tj: (3)
Here, CVj;k is the conditional expected value of information level j in period
k, and ²j;k;t is a standard normally distributed error term. Identical to the
experimental treatment uninformed traders I0 are programmed to use a random
6Most subjects already took part in other experiments in economics, but none of them
participated in experimental asset markets before.
8strategy,
Bidk;t = Pk;t § ²k;t;
Askk;t = Pk;t § ²k;t; (4)
with Pk;t denoting the current market price at time t of period k and ²k;t
stands for a standard normally distributed error term.
Finally, a matching algorithm checks whether the currently placed ask (bid)
is lower (higher) than the best bid (ask) in the order book. In these cases a
trade occurs at the price of the best bid (ask) in the order book. Those limit
orders that can not be matched immediately are included into the order book.
2.5.2 Trading Strategies and Order Matching in the Setting EQUIL
With all other things being equal to BASE, the informed traders I1 to I4 can
choose between both strategies. Beginning with the situation in which each
agent except I0 uses his fundamental strategy, the worst performing agent after
5000 independent runs switches to the random strategy. The simulation is re-
run and if the agent is better o® than before, he remains with this strategy.
In a next step, the algorithm searches again for the worst performing agent
whose strategy is then switched, etc. This updating algorithm runs until a
Nash-Equilibrium is reached in which no agent has an incentive to switch to the
other strategy as this would only lower his return.
2.5.3 Simulation Parameters
Table 2 gives an overview over the similarities/di®erences of the experimental
and the simulation approach. One can see that the experimental and simulation
setting is very similar except for the number of traders per market, the possible
trading quantity at each trade and the matching algorithm of the limit orders.
This is because we want to keep the model as simple as possible and to limit the
number of model assumptions to an absolute minimum. With this simpli¯cation
9we expect that the simulation output does not interfere with irrelevant model
assumptions which could potentially distort the distribution of agents' returns.
Insert Table 2 about here
3 Results
3.1 Method for Measuring Abnormal Returns
To detect the performance of the traders in the experiment and in the sim-
ulations conditional on their information level we calculate abnormal returns
(outperformance):
ARj;m = ln(FWj;m) ¡ ln(FWm): (5)
Here, FWj;m stands for the ¯nal wealth (stocks multiplied with the fun-
damental value at the end of the experiment, FVend, plus money holdings) of
information level j in market m and FWm de¯nes the average ¯nal wealth across
all traders in the market. The benchmarking on the market average in equation
(5) is crucial to purge idiosyncratic characteristics of individual markets. The
ability of di®erent information levels to outperform the market and others is of
main interest, irrespective of upward or downward movements of the market as
a whole.
To check whether the experimental results are statistically signi¯cant, we
run OLS regressions with the dependent variable ARj;m,
ARj;m = ® + ¯1I1m + ¯2I2m + ¯3I3m + ¯4I4m + ²j;m; (6)
where I1 to I4 are binary dummy variables for the various information levels.
With this approach we are able to analyze I0's outperformance to the market
(intercept ®) and the performance of each information level in relation to I0. The
outperformance to the market of the other information levels and the di®erences
10in abnormal returns between all information levels will be addressed with a
Wald-coe±cient test. We account for heteroscedasticity in the residuals by
using the White-statistics White 1980.
3.2 General Overview
Figure 2 presents the results for abnormal returns as a function of informa-
tion level for the simulation setting BASE (top left panel), the simulation set-
ting EQUIL (top right panel) and the experimental treatment (bottom panel)
graphically.
Insert Figure 2 about here
In the simulation setting BASE insiders end up best while the average in-
formed traders with information level I1 and I2 clearly underperform the market.
The latter are clearly beaten by uninformed random traders I0 who underper-
form the market marginally. When looking at the simulation results of the
equilibrium setting, EQUIL, (top right panel) we observe that traders from I0
to I2 apply a random strategy and underperform the market with roughly {
1.7%. Agents with I3 and I4 adopt a fundamental strategy but only the insiders
outperform all other agents clearly.7
When focusing on the aggregate data for the experimental treatment (solid
line) we ¯nd that the results look similar to the EQUIL-case as the abnormal
returns of I0 to I2 are equal at roughly {1%. The insiders outperform all other
traders and the market by 2.4%. Interestingly, it is also evident that the disper-
sion of abnormal returns hardly decreases with repetition, which is a ¯rst hint
of no learning throughout the repetitions.
7For each agent changing strategy would yield lower returns. For I0 to I2 and I4 a c.p.




In Table 3 we run the model of equation 6 to test on di®erences between the
information levels within each repetition.8 For the aggregate data set (¯rst
column) we modify equation 6 in a way to apply a panel regression. The infor-
mation levels in the six markets serve as cross-sections (30 observations) with
three observations over time each.
Insert Table 3 about here
On aggregate we observe that the returns of all traders with I0 to I2 are
indistinguishable from each other and that these traders do not underperform
the market signi¯cantly. Only insiders I4 signi¯cantly outperform the market
by 2.4% and subjects with I0 to I2 up to 3.5 percentage points. This pattern is
very similar in each repetition, though not always signi¯cant due to a relatively
low sample size. The results perfectly ¯t with the ¯ndings of Huber et al. (2008)
although they adopt di®erent market models.
In the following sections we analyze and discuss whether the consistent pat-
terns over repetitions are based on overcon¯dence, no learning of the subjects or
whether they are caused by the asymmetric information structure of the model.
3.3.2 Overcon¯dence as no Explanation for the Persistent Under-
performance of the Average Informed
To test whether the persistent underperformance of average informed subjects
across repetitions is due to overcon¯dence we ran a questionnaire after each
repetition. Beside demographic questions we asked the subjects to self-evaluate
their performance with respect to the performance of all other traders and with
respect to the second trader of the same information level. In detail, we formu-
8Table E1 in Appendix B goes into detail for the experiment and provides both the ab-
normal returns and the trading volume of each information level in each repetition of each
market.
12lated the following two questions, which the subjects were able to answer only
with "yes" or "no":
1. Do you think that your ¯nal wealth is higher than the average ¯nal wealth
of all ten traders?
2. Do you think that your ¯nal wealth is higher than the ¯nal wealth of the
other trader with the same information level?
Insert Figure 3 about here
In Figure 3 we present the results separated for information level and repe-
tition. When looking at question 1 about being better than the market average
(left panel) we ¯nd that especially for better informed traders con¯dence in-
creases with information level, but only one value is above 50%. This means
that most traders believe that they are below average, which is an indication
of subjects undercon¯dence. Especially the worst performing traders I1 and
I2 su®er from undercon¯dence as only roughly 20% of them believe that they
outperform the market although they even did it in approximately 50% of all
cases. Question 2 on subject's performance compared to the second trader of
the same information level yields similar results for I1 and I2. Only about 35%
of all traders believe that they outperform the other trader although the realized
ratio is 50% by de¯nition.9
Therefore we conclude that overcon¯dence has no in°uence on the persis-
tent underperformance to the market return of the average informed subjects.
In contrast, traders that slightly underperform the market seem to be under-
con¯dent as our overcon¯dence measures show values of approximately 20% for
traders with I1 and I2.
3.3.3 No Learning over and Moderate Learning Within Repetitions
To get a ¯rst impression of the changes in subjects' abnormal returns over
time, potentially due to learning, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns
9As the results clearly show no evidence for overcon¯dence we refrain to conduct tests on
signi¯cance.
13(CARj;m;r;k) for each information level j of market m in repetition r of each
period,
CARj;m;r;k = ln(Wj;m;r;k) ¡ ln(Wm;r;k); (7)
with (Wm;r;k) indicating the corresponding mean wealth. In a next step we
sum up across the markets to get one measure of CAR for each information level
in each repetition (CARj;r;k). The left panel of Figure 4 provides the details
and we see no tendency towards declining CAR's over repetition.
Insert Figure 4 about here
In the right panel of Figure 4 we calculate the standard deviation of the
¯ve CARj;m;r;k's in each period of each market. Then we average these six
standard deviations across all markets to obtain one value for each period
("STD CAR"). The same procedure is repeated for the di®erence between
the maximum (max(CARj;m;r;k)) and the minimum (min(CARj;m;r;k)) CAR
("MAX ¡ MIN CAR"). Out of the right panel of Figure 4 one can see that
the cumulative abnormal returns develop similarly over time as there seems to
be no trend towards declining STD CAR and MAX ¡ MIN CAR over the
repetitions. Again, this provides evidence that no learning regarding abnormal
returns takes place over the repetitions.
To get a broader picture about learning behavior we do not only focus on
abnormal returns but also on di®erent variables such as trading volume, over-
valuation, mispricing, trades, etc. To detect whether these variables change
statistically signi¯cant over time we set up the following panel-regression model
with 6 cross-sections (markets) and 60 observations over time:
ym;k = ® + ¯1REP2m;k + ¯2REP3m;k + ¯3(PERIOD ¢ REP1)m;k +
¯4(PERIOD ¢ REP2)m;k + ¯5(PERIOD ¢ REP3)m;k + ²m;k: (8)
14Here, REP2 and REP3 are binary dummy variables for the repetitions two
and three and PERIOD stands for the periods 1 to 20 within each repetition.
Thus, with the interaction terms of type PERIOD ¢ REP we account for the
speci¯c time trend within each repetition.
As dependent variables ym;k we test for those variables which are frequently
a®ected by experience according to existing literature. OVERVAL represents
the di®erence between the mean price, P, and the fundamental value, FV.
According to Dufwenberg et al. (2005) and Hussam et al. (2008) repetition and
thus experience decreases overvaluation in asset markets of the SSW-type (see
the paper of Smith et al. (1988) for the model design). Therefore, we implement
OVERVAL as a proxy for overvaluation and the absolute value of overvaluation
as a proxy for mispricing.
In the literature it is commonly reported (e.g. Plott and Sunder 1982)
that trading frequency declines in the course of an experimental session due to
learning about the market institution. We investigate this by testing on the
dependent variables "Volume", "Trades", and "Limit Orders". Furthermore,
we modify the model of equation 8 for STD CAR and MAX ¡MIN CAR by
excluding the interaction terms as they would distort the coe±cient values of
REP2 and REP3 due to the dominating time trend in the interaction terms.
Insert Table 4 about here
When focusing on OVERVAL and abs(OVERVAL) we ¯nd no learning e®ects
over and within the repetitions. Instead, the average mispricing per period even
increases signi¯cantly from REP1 to REP3 by 1.6. Furthermore, this pattern is
also evident when looking at the interaction terms for REP1 and REP2, meaning
that in these repetitions market e±ciency decreases over time.
When measuring the learning e®ects with the variables Volume, Trades, and
Limit Orders hardly any e®ects are observable over the repetitions with only
one marginally signi¯cant negative coe±cient. Interestingly, although overall
trading frequency decreases insigni¯cantly over repetitions, limit orders increase
15slightly but insigni¯cantly. It seems that traders act more cautiously over the
repetitions by placing more limit orders and trading a little less. Within each
repetition the learning e®ects are much clearer and in line with existing lit-
erature. All nine interaction terms are negative with six coe±cients being
signi¯cant. Similar and thus insigni¯cant patterns over the repetitions can
be found for the measures of cumulative abnormal returns { STD CAR and
MAX ¡MIN CAR. This con¯rms the results which have already been shown
in Figure 4.
We conclude that although moderate learning takes place within the repeti-
tions, hardly any learning is observable over repetitions as repetition 1 already
comes relatively close to the simulated equilibrium solution.
3.3.4 Information System as Origin of the Persistent Underperfor-
mance of the Average Informed
As the behavioral explanation overcon¯dence is rejected when looking for origins
of the distribution of traders returns, we o®er a non-behavioral explanation.
When returning to the simulation results in Figure 2 we ¯nd that agents with
I1 and I2 can at best improve their abnormal returns to those of a random
trader when they ignore their fundamental information in equilibrium. Thus, it
seems that for traders other than I4 it is impossible to outperform the market
persistently. In repetition one of the experimental markets subjects already
come relatively close to the equilibrium output of the simulation EQUIL with
a relatively low dispersion of abnormal returns.
To check whether the distribution of subjects' trading strategies across infor-
mation level comes close to the simulation benchmarks we calculate the number
of trades conforming to fundamental strategy. For each information level in each
repetition of each market we sum up all purchases at prices below its conditional
expected value, CV , and all sales at prices above its conditional expected value,
CV . Then we divide this sum by the number of trades of the corresponding in-
formation level to arrive at the percentage of fundamental strategy on all trades,
16FUND. Values close to 50% indicate no fundamental trading as even a random
trader would exhibit 50% on average.
Insert Figure 5 about here
Figure 5 provides the average ratios for each repetition and information level.
We ¯nd that traders with I4 apply a fundamental strategy in roughly 80% of all
trades while the average informed traders I1 and I2 realize the uselessness of their
information. With roughly 57% of their trades conforming to a fundamental
strategy they reach values which are very close to those of a random trader,
indicating that they mainly ignore their fundamentals and thus manage to avoid
being even stronger exploited by the insiders which is the case in the simulation
setting BASE.
With the OLS-regression in equation 9 we check whether the di®erences
across the information levels are statistically signi¯cant and apply the same
procedure as in equation 6 when testing for abnormal returns.
FUNDj;m = ® + ¯1I2m + ¯2I3m + ¯3I4m + ²j;m; (9)
Here, FUNDj;m measures the percentage of fundamental strategy on all
trades of information level j in market m. I2 to I4 are binary dummy variables
for the various information levels. To check the aggregate data we modify
equation 9 by setting up a panel with 30 cross-sections (¯ve information levels
in the six markets) and three observations over time each.
Insert Table 5 about here
Table 5 con¯rms the results of Figure 5. On aggregate the percentage of
fundamental strategy for the insiders is signi¯cantly higher compared to both
I1 and I2. Although the ratios for I4 decrease slightly over repetitions, the
di®erence between insiders and the average informed remains signi¯cant in most
repetitions separately.10
10This decrease in fundamental strategy of the insiders coincides with a stronger mispricing
and thus a lowered market e±ciency in repetition 3. See the results for abs(OVERVAL) in
Table 4 for further details.
17The indistinguishable returns of average informed traders and uninformed
random traders are a robust ¯nding of the presented model with asymmetric
fundamental information. As long as traders with insider information mainly
apply a fundamental strategy, average informed traders who use their funda-
mental information will end up below the market return and underperform a
simple random strategy as is the case in the simulation setting BASE. Instead,
their dominant strategy is to become an uninformed trader too by ignoring their
fundamental information. Thus, it is not that much surprising that we ¯nd no
learning over repetitions (measured by the abnormal returns of the traders)
as the ¯rst repetition already comes relatively close to the simulated optimum
when looking at the strategies of the various information levels.
4 Conclusion and Discussion
In this paper we presented results from experimental asset markets and sim-
ulations in which traders are asymmetrically informed about the fundamental
value of an asset. To obtain benchmarks we ran two simulation settings. To
control for potential learning over time we ran the experimental markets three
times with identical subjects at identical information levels.
In the simulation setting BASE, in which all traders (except the randomized
agents I0) traded according to their fundamental information, average informed
(I1 and I2) underperformed the random traders who only marginally underper-
formed the market return. When we allowed for switching between a random
and a fundamental strategy for all traders, I0 to I2 traded randomly and both I3
and I4 adopted a fundamental strategy. In this equilibrium setting EQUIL only
I4 outperformed the market on the expense of the three worst informed traders
who all ended up slightly below the market return. The aggregate results of the
experimental markets came close to the equilibrium simulation setting and are
in line with experimental evidence provided by Huber et al. (2008) and with
empirical studies on insider trading and mutual funds performance (e.g. Lakon-
18ishok and Lee 2001, Lin and Howe 1990, and Seyhun 1986 for studies on insider
performance and Carhart 1997, Jensen 1968, and Malkiel 1995, 2003a,b, 2005
for studies on mutual fund performance). Similarly, insiders outperform and
mutual fund managers slightly underperform a broad benchmark index even
before transaction costs. Clearly, it is impossible to assess the information level
of mutual funds manager empirically but it is reasonable to assume that they
are neither insiders nor completely uninformed.
The persistent underperformance to the market return of the average in-
formed traders observed in the experimental markets was not due to overcon-
¯dence as our questionnaire provided evidence that they were undercon¯dent.
We attribute this undercon¯dence to the relatively complex market design. We
think that this point is important to mention as in the studies on overcon-
¯dence cited above relatively easy general knowledge questions or relatively
simple structured ¯nancial settings are used.
Furthermore, we observed no learning over the repetitions, as even the out-
come of repetition one was in good accordance with the equilibrium solution.
We attribute this ¯nding which di®ers from Dufwenberg et al. (2005) and Hus-
sam et al. (2008) to the good intuition of average informed traders that their
fundamental information was useless. Only within the repetitions moderate
learning e®ects were observed as trading volume and trades decreased.
We found that the origin of the persistent underperformance of traders with
I1 and I2 is the asymmetric information structure of the model which makes it
impossible for less informed traders to outperform uninformed random traders
systematically. Although the experimental subjects with average information
su®ered from their informational disadvantage they quickly learned that ig-
noring their fundamental information would be better than being even more
exploited while trading on the basis of their fundamental information. We con-
¯rmed this with our strategy analysis showing that average informed used their
fundamental strategy very rarely while insiders applied a fundamental strategy
in 80% of all trades which is in good accordance with the strategy distribution
19in the equilibrium simulation setting.
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Figure 1: Conditional expected values, CV , of the di®erent information levels
as a function of time in one representative market. The fundamental value of
the asset equals the CV of information level I4. Beginning with the insiders, I4,
the CV -function of information level j is shifted (4-j) periods to the right.
24Parameter Agent 1 Agent 2
Range of Wt (sec.) 10-20 20-30
Range of Q 3-7 1-5
Table 1: Parameters for the computerized random traders, I0, in the experi-
ments. "Range of Wt" indicates the uniformly distributed waiting time between
consecutive limit orders. "Range of Q" de¯nes the uniformly distributed span

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 2: Outperformance to the market return in % (average abnormal returns,
ARj;m) as a function of information level of the simulation setting BASE (top
left panel), the simulation setting EQUIL (top right panel) and the experimental
treatment (bottom panel).
27Dependent Variable
Abnormal returns in % (ARj;m)









































R2 9:17 8:82 21:07 10:20
n 90 30 30 30
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signi¯cance levels.
Table 3: Panel (aggregate data) and OLS (single repetitions) regression re-
sults for the experiments. Dependent variable: abnormal returns, ARj;m. The
independent variables, I1 to I4, are binary dummy variables. The coe±cient
values are given in percent and the p-values are mentioned in parentheses for
double-sided alternatives.
























































































































Figure 3: Questionnaire on overcon¯dence in the experimental markets: Ques-
tion 1: Do you think that your ¯nal wealth is higher than the average ¯nal
wealth of all ten traders? (left panel); Question 2: Do you think that your
¯nal wealth is higher than the ¯nal wealth of the other trader with the same
information level? (right panel). The bars represent the ratio of answers with
"yes" on all answers for each information level and repetition.
























































Figure 4: Cumulative abnormal returns of each information level, CARj;r;k,
over periods and repetitions (left panel). The standard deviation (STD CAR)
out the CAR's and the di®erence between the maximum and the minimum of





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5: Average percentage of the use of fundamental information among all
trades for each information level in each repetition in the experimental markets.
50% represent the ratio of a random trader.
32Dependent Variable
Percentage of fundamental strategy, FUND

































R2 19:32 31:86 19:08 14:47
n 72 24 24 24
*, ** and *** represent the 10%, 5% and the 1% signi¯cance levels.
Table 5: Panel (aggregate data) and OLS (single repetitions) regression results
for the experiments. Dependent variable: Percentage of fundamental strategy,
FUND. The independent variables, I2 to I4, are binary dummy variables. The
coe±cient values are given in percent and the p-values are mentioned in paren-
theses for double-sided alternatives.
33Appendix
Appendix A: Fundamental Value Paths







































Figure E1: Fundamental value paths, FVk, as a function of period of the exper-
imental markets. The paths are perfectly randomized over repetitions.



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































36Appendix C: Experimental Instructions
We welcome you to this experimental session and ask you to refrain from talking
to each other for the duration of the experiment11
Background of the experiment
This experiment consists of a market in which ten traders trade the shares of a
¯ctitious company for 20-30 consecutive periods (months).
Market procedure
The market is characterized by an asymmetric information structure. The best
informed (I4) receive all relevant information on the company. The second
best informed (I3) receive the same information one period later. This process
continues until the worst informed, I1, receive the information, who have an
informational disadvantage of 3 periods compared to the insiders.
Trading will occur with a double auction market mechanism. The price of
the shares is determined by your and the other traders' actions in the market.
You are free to submit as many bids and asks (in the range of 10 to 200 with
up to two decimal places) as you wish.
Total wealth
Your wealth is the sum of your money balance and the market value of your
shares (the number of shares you hold multiplied with the current price). Your
wealth will change during a period as the market price changes, even if you do
not trade; the most recent trading price will be used to value your shares.
Fundamental value and CV
All relevant information on the future development of the company are included
in the variable "fundamental value", which stands for the fundamentally justi¯ed
11At the beginning of repetition 1 in T3 we handed out a brief additional written instruction
which informed the subjects exactly about the procedure of the three repetitions.
37valuation of the company at any time. The fundamental value starts at 40 and
will change randomly each period. The random change each period is +0.5%
with a standard deviation of 7.2%. Examples:
² The probability of the fundamental value increasing by more than 14.9%
= 2.3%
² The probability of the fundamental value decreasing by more than 13.9%
= 2.3%
² The probability for the fundamental value increasing by more than 7.7%
=16%
² The probability for the fundamental value decreasing decrease by more
than 6.7% =16%.
The fundamental value is especially relevant at the end of the experiment,
since all shares will be bought back by the experimenter from you at that time at
this value. Each period you (as well as every other participant with exception of
I0) receive an estimate (CV) of the fundamental value. Traders with information
level 4 (I4) get the most up-to-date information, i.e. the fundamental value
of the stock in the current period. Traders with information level 3 receive
the same information with one period delay. Traders with information level 2
get the same information as I4, just two periods later. Finally, investors with
information level I1 receive the same fundamental information as I4 with three
periods delay. As mentioned before, traders with I0 don't get any information
on the fundamentals of the company.
The following table gives a brief overview on the number of traders per
information level and their initial endowments:
At the end of each period a history screen will give a short summary on your
endowments, past prices and trading activity on the market.


















































Figure E2: Example of a realisation of fundamental value/CV as a function of
information level
Information level Stocks Money No. traders Lag to fundamental value
I0 40 1,600 2 no information
I1 40 1,600 2 3
I2 40 1,600 2 2
I3 40 1,600 2 1
I4 40 1,600 2 0
Table E2: Overview of initial endowments and traders per information level.
39Figure E3: Trading screen
40Figure E4: History screen
Some important details
² Each period lasts 100 seconds. The experiment will be terminated between
periods 20 and 30, with equal probability at each termination date.
² Final payment: At the end of the experiment you will be paid in EUR.
At this time all your stocks will be bought back at the fundamental value
(equal to the estimate of I4 in the ¯nal period). Your money will be added
to the value of your stocks and this amount will be converted into EUR at
the rate of 1 EUR = 175 Taler. So, at the end of the experiment only I4
are perfectly informed on the fundamental value of the stocks. The worse
your information level, the imprecise your estimate (CV) will be.
Example: If your ¯nal wealth is 3860 units of money you earn 3860/175
= 22.10
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It is hard to beat the Monkeys - On the Value of Asymmetric Fundamental 
Information in Asset Markets 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we present results from experimental asset markets and simulations 
with traders who receive asymmetric information about the fundamental value of an 
asset. In the experimental markets with repetition insiders outperform the market and 
uninformed computerized random traders (monkeys) perform equally well compared 
to average informed traders. This is in line with the results of the equilibrium 
simulation output in which traders choose between a random strategy and their 
fundamental strategy. We further find that pattern of average informed not being able 
to beat the uninformed is not due to their overconfidence but due to the asymmetric 
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